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ABSTRACT 
 
In this paper we argue that pre-election polls and prediction markets 
reflect two different processes which, by analyzing them together, can help us 
understand if and how key events which occur during an election campaign 
influence the final outcome. While polls can be seen as reflecting the voters’ 
enlightening process towards realizing their vote preferences, prediction 
markets have this process incorporated into their prediction. We study the 
movements of weekly poll ratings and IEM market predictions and measure 
the impact selected events have on these in the run-up to the US 2004 and 
2008 presidential elections. We conclude that the Swift Boat ad campaign in 
2004 was an enlightening event which moved poll ratings in favor of 
President Bush, towards the level the IEM market had predicted already 
before the Swift Boat event. The financial crisis in 2008, on the other hand, 
was an enlightened event. It came as news to both market traders and poll 
respondents, sealing the victory for Obama. 
 
INTRODUCTION
 
Can events that unfold during an election campaign really change the 
outcome on Election Day? Or are they merely part of an anticipated process 
where the outcome can be foreseen on beforehand? In this paper we try to 
answer this question by studying movements in poll ratings and in prediction 
market prices in the run-up to the 2004 and 2008 US presidential elections. 
We argue that poll ratings and market predictions reflect two distinct 
                                                     
1 The paper has previously been presented at the Third International Conference on 
Prediction and Information Markets, April 3-5 2011, Nottingham Business School.  
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processes, and that by analyzing the two barometers in combination we may 
enhance our understanding about if and how events have an impact on the 
election result. 
The paper starts with a theoretical discussion about the link between 
enlightening and enlightened events, poll ratings and prediction markets.  It 
concludes with a typology with four categories which the events can fall into. 
Next, we introduce the events that are to be analyzed for the two elections, 
followed by a presentation of method and data. In the analysis we find that the 
Swift Boat Veterans ad campaign in 2004 was an event that helped Bush 
boost his poll ratings, while it did not affect the market predictions which 
already were lying at the level the polls later reached. In 2008 the financial 
crisis came as an unexpected shock into the election campaign and pushed 
both poll ratings and market predictions in disfavor of the incumbent 
Republican Party’s candidate. 
 
 
(a) Enlightening and enlightened processes 
 
In their article “Why Are Presidential Election Polls So Variable When 
Votes Are So Predictable?”, Gelman and King (1993) argue that election 
campaigns are enlightening processes which help the voters realize their 
political preferences. They support their argument by showing that the pre-
election polls are more variable and inaccurate at the beginning of the election 
campaign while steadily becoming more accurate towards the end. There exist 
fundamental variables that “decide” the vote, but the voters are not aware of 
these variables at the start of the campaign. The role of the campaigning 
parties (and the media) is therefore to provide the information about these 
issues, so that “voters gradually improve their knowledge of their fundamental 
variables and generally have sufficient information by election day”(Gelman 
and King 1993: 435). Those with knowledge of these fundamental variables 
should hence be able to predict the movement of the voters several weeks or 
months in advance of the election.  
Holbrook (1996) makes a similar argument as Gelman and King: Each 
presidential election has according to Holbrook an equilibrium level of 
support for presidential candidates. This equilibrium level resembles 
Converse’s (1966) normal election in the sense that in each election there 
exists an outcome toward which the public is naturally predisposed (Holbrook 
1996). This equilibrium outcome is believed to be a function of prevailing 
national conditions. The role of the campaigners is to generate information to 
the voters, so that they gradually increase their awareness of these national 
conditions. The equilibrium level is however not certain to be reached, 
because it presupposes an equally strong campaign by both parties. If a party 
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launches a bad campaign, its candidate is likely to receive fewer voters than 
the equilibrium level indicates.  
Exactly what these “fundamental variables” are is a source of dispute 
among researchers, but generally vote forecasting models include variables 
measuring the national state of the economy and political variables such as 
party/candidate incumbency (Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2000; Campbell 
2005; Abramowitz 2008) and whether or not the country is at war (Fair 2002). 
The assumption is that while there is a stable party-loyal base, the change in 
the aggregate vote outcome from one American presidential election to 
another is a product of a few key variables. Based on empirical analyses of 
previous elections, researchers identify variables which ex post are able to 
explain the variance of the vote share on Election Day. The vote varies 
between elections, but it varies predictably according to the values on 
variables such as for example unemployment, GDP growth, war/peace and 
incumbency dummies.   
But is it true that all shifts in opinion in the pre-election period are merely 
reflecting the voters’ enlightening process towards their fundamental political 
preferences? Does not the unique context in which each election takes place 
influence the outcome? When Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes (1966) 
introduced the concept of “the normal vote”, they argued that the normal vote 
consists of both a long-term and a short-term component. The long-term 
component was a simple reflection of the distribution of underlying party 
loyalties, a distribution that is stable over substantial periods of time 
(Campbell et al. 1966). On top of this baseline vote division there are short-
term factors that also influence the voters’ choices. For each specific election 
there may be current deviations from the norm, reflecting the voters’ reactions 
to contextual circumstances such as the candidates’ personalities or important 
events unfolding during the election campaign. The final vote is thus an 
interplay of basic dispositions and short-run influences (Campbell et al. 1966). 
In other words, the political preferences of the voters may change during the 
pre-election period not only as a result of an enlightening campaign which 
guides them towards their fundamental preferences; but also as a consequence 
of true preference changes connected to that particular election. Hence, before 
an election it is possible that voters undergo both an enlightening process 
steering them towards their fundamental preferences, as well as an 
“enlightened” process, in the meaning that voters acquire new, unique 
knowledge about the particular election which influences their vote decisions, 
but is not part of their enlightening process. Below we argue that these 
processes can be distinguished by analyzing poll ratings and election market 
predictions.  
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(b) Pre-election polls and prediction markets 
 
Prior to an important election, polling activity normally increases 
substantially (Wlezien and Erikson 2002). The increased interest in polls in 
the period before an election comes from the belief that they have valuable 
information about how the election will turn out. Although some scholars 
stress that pre-election polls not are suited as prediction tools (Worcester 
1996), they are used for that purpose by the media, scholars, and the industry 
itself (Berg et al. 2003; Buchanan 1986; Traugott 2001). In fact, the current 
polling methods had their break-through 70 years ago exactly because they 
were able to predict the 1936 US Presidential election better than the 
dominating methods at that time. However, pre-election polls measure the 
current political preferences among potential voters, not what they will vote 
on Election Day. Therefore, raw polls may not predict the outcome very well 
weeks ahead of an election, but can be a good tool to measure the voters’ 
decision making process in the run-up to the election. 2 
Prediction markets, as defined by Berg, Forsythe, Nelson and Rietz 
(2001) are internet-based financial markets run with the purpose of using the 
information content in market values to make predictions about specific future 
events. The intention with these markets is to show the traders’ best collective 
guess about the outcome of future events, in our case political election results. 
In these markets values of traded contracts depend directly on future 
outcomes and, hence, prices give information about these outcomes (Berg et 
al. 2001: 79).  
Traders in a prediction market are participants who self-select into the 
market and have a direct economic motivation to obtain relevant information 
about the election. If they are to profit from their trades, they must be able to 
separate political news which is relevant to the election outcome from those 
that are not. If they possess unique information, or if they act upon new public 
information quicker than other traders do, they can make money in the 
prediction market. Equally important is the traders’ ability not to react if the 
“news” is not relevant for the election, if the “news” is old news, or if its 
effect on the voters evaporates before they cast their vote. These are 
considerations respondents in polls do not – and are not supposed to – make. 
While pre-election polls might reflect the voters’ perceptions at the time the 
respondents were surveyed, the events they react to in the campaign may not 
be the same events which in the end make a difference on the election result. 
                                                     
2 Though the question to what extent opinion polls actually reflect the views of the population they measure is well-known in social 
sciences (Croves 1989; Beck et al. 2006; Crespi 1988; Wlezien and Erikson 2002). 
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Both Shaw and Roberts (2000) as well as Kou and Sobel (2004) have 
previously argued for the benefits of analyzing prediction markets in relation 
to election campaigns. During the last years we have witnessed a rise in 
interest for this methodology also in political science, but few have utilized it 
for electoral research.3 Kou and Sobel (2004) offer theoretical arguments that 
market prices will be more accurate in predicting election results than polls 
will, given the reasonable assumption that market traders are aware of the 
polls and use their information when trading in the prediction market. Their 
claim is supported by 20 years of empirical evidence that market predictions 
are more accurate than raw polls both in the long and short run (Berg et al. 
2003, 2008). Shaw and Roberts used daily IEM winner takes all prices to 
study the effect of campaign events the last few months before the elections in 
1992 and 1996. Prediction market prices are better suited to study campaign 
events, because “movement in the [IEM]… reflects the independent (non-
predictable) impact of campaigning and campaign events.” (Shaw 2000: 264). 
Within the frames of Gelman and King’s characterization of campaigns, Shaw 
and Roberts assert that the movement of the market prices represents an 
enlightened process, as opposed to the enlightening process that the voters 
undergo.4 
Polls and prediction markets thus reflect two distinct processes which 
yield different information from the pre-election period. By analyzing them 
together, we may learn how events influence the voters’ choice on Election 
Day. Table 1 depicts the four categories an event can fall into. An event is 
classified  as  enlightening if it has an impact on the poll  ratings but not on 
the market  predictions.  If  the  event  impacts  both  poll  ratings  and  market 
                                                     
3 An exception is Malhotra and Snowberg (2011), who have used conditional market 
contracts to analyze the influence of primary and caucus results on the candidates’ 
chances in the general election, and to assess whether or not states with early 
primaries have a disproportionate impact on the nomination process. 
4 Having said this, we acknowledge that what we are studying are the traders’ 
perceptions of the candidates’ likely vote share on Election Day. If the prediction 
changes from one day to another, all we know is that the traders then have changed 
their beliefs about the outcome. Since the only reference point for the predictions is 
the result on Election Day, it is not possible to determine for sure whether or not a 
movement of the market prediction at a given time point actually represents a true 
movement for the candidates’ share of the popular vote. Likewise, it cannot be ruled 
out that the polls are in fact yielding better predictions than the prediction markets at 
any given moment. For example, if a poll 100 days before the election is five 
percentage points off from the election result and the market prediction is right on 
target the same day, we cannot rule out that the poll prediction was correct and the 
market prediction wrong at that moment, but that changes that took place the last 100 
days altered the conditions for the candidates and modified the election outcome.  
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Table 1. Types of Events 
 
 
 Market reaction? 
Yes No 
 
 
Poll 
reaction? 
Yes Enlightened event Enlightening event 
 
No 
 
Early reaction by markets for 
enlightened event 
(Or error/manipulation) 
 
Irrelevant event (or 
method unable to detect 
reaction) 
 
predictions (in the same direction), then it is an enlightened event. If the event 
only has an impact on the market predictions, then the markets may react 
early to an event that is not reflected in the same way in the poll ratings, or the 
effect on the prediction is a market error/manipulation. If an event has no 
impact on either poll ratings or market predictions, then the event is irrelevant 
for the aggregate vote outcome. 
 
THE TWO ELECTIONS – CONTEXTS AND EVENTS 
 
The extensive literature on presidential voting focuses among other 
factors on the economy (Tufte 1978; Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2000; 
Erikson and Wlezien 2008) and incumbency (Abramowitz 2008; Holbrook 
2008) as determinants of the election outcome. Whether or not the nation is at 
war is another factor in the literature (Hibbs 2000; Fair 2002). How these 
factors are operationalized varies, but the main findings suggest that a 
worsening economy hurts the incumbent candidate, that presidential 
incumbency favors the candidate but party incumbency does not, and that a 
“rally around the flag” effect is an advantage for the sitting president if he is 
candidate for the coming election. The events we have picked out for the two 
elections all deal with one or more of these three topics, as we will see below.  
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(a) 2004 Election 
 
Though the Iraqi invasion in 2003 initially was a military success, the 
occupation thereafter did not go according to the Bush administration’s plan. 
The troops seemed to have walked into a quagmire from which it was 
impossible to get out of, and opposition against the war (or at least the 
handling of it) was on the rise among American voters. The post 9/11 feeling 
of unity among the Americans was waning, and when the long campaign for 
his second term had started, George W. Bush had become a polarizing 
political figure. The 2004 election would therefore become a referendum on 
the incumbent president, and the theme would mainly circle around Iraq and 
other measures that the Bush Administration had initiated against terrorism. 
Two of the three events analyzed for this election deal directly with the Iraq 
war, while the third deals with the presidential candidates’ credibility as a 
leader in war time. 
The first event was an unforeseen event which exploded in the media. On 
April 29th 2004, pictures depicting American soldiers humiliating Iraqi 
prisoners in the Abu Ghraib prison were revealed. This was a great 
humiliation to the Iraqi people, and a tough pill to swallow for those who saw 
the American-lead troops as liberators rather than enemy occupying forces. 
The photos came at a time when the American-led coalition was struggling in 
Iraq and popular opinion was turning against the war. 
The second event happened two months later with the handover of power 
to Iraq. What was supposed to be a moment of celebration for the president on 
June 30th instead once again turned the world media and the American voters’ 
attention to a troublesome area for the President. Though the handover was 
handled in a low-key manner (and two days earlier than scheduled), the fierce 
critique of Bush, and his arguable lack of control with the situation in Iraq 
might have scored points for Kerry, who was in stark opposition to the 
Administration’s handling of the occupation. 
The third event deals with the Swift Boat Veterans. The Swift Boat 
Veterans were a group of Vietnam War veterans that through a series of ads – 
starting August 5 – called into question Kerry’s accomplishments during the 
war in Vietnam (Caesar and Busch 2005). Among other accusations, they 
contested the legitimacy of the purple heart Kerry had received, and they 
generally discredited his effort in the military service. Before the Swift Boat 
Veterans entered the campaign, Kerry had strongly emphasized his service in 
Vietnam in an effort to show the voters that he was not the weak leader that 
his opponents suggested he was. He was now challenged on the core of his 
character, and this issue became the main topic in the media for weeks to 
come. Bush had the advantage of being the incumbent president, and the 
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voters knew what they had in him, but did not know what they would get with 
Kerry.  
(b) 2008 Election 
 
The two events included in our analysis of the 2008 campaign are the 
selection of Sarah Palin as Republican Vice Presidential candidate, and the 
collapse of the Lehman Brothers bank. The Republican Party elected Senator 
John McCain, a moderate and experienced politician who had considerable 
experience from Washington but also could represent a change in direction 
from the Bush era. Up until Clinton’s concession the campaign period had 
been dominated by the Democratic show-down, and McCain had struggled to 
get attention. This would however change on August 29th when the VP 
candidate was announced right before the Republican Convention were to 
take place in Minneapolis-St. Paul. The surprising selection was made in an 
effort to appeal to the base of the Republican Party, as well as to compensate 
for criticism against McCain’s age (Caesar et al. 2009). Sarah Palin was 
however inexperienced with politics at the national level, and this became 
evident as she was exposed in the media. Even though Palin was new to 
national politics, she represented much of what was associated with the Bush 
administration.  
In the background throughout the campaign period was the dire economic 
straits the US economy was moving into. With the collapse of the investment 
bank Lehman Brothers, it moved to the forefront of media and campaign 
attention. The collapse of Lehman Brothers signified in many ways the event 
when the U.S. and the world realized that the financial crisis that had lasted 
about a year was both broader and more severe than first thought. From being 
treated as an isolated crisis based on rotten American subprime loans, the 
financial downturn evolved into a discussion about the sustainability of the 
existing form of the market economy. It became clear that the growth in the 
U.S. – and to some extent the rest of the (mainly Western) world – for the past 
decade largely had been based on creative financial innovations that did not 
diminish risk as they were supposed to, but rather hid them behind a veil of 
financial packages. Subprime loans were split up and spread around the 
increasingly integrated world of finance, but no one new exactly where the 
rotten apples were. The result was a lack of confidence in the financial system 
as such. Though the realization of the magnitude of the crisis was an evolving 
process, the collapse of the reputed Lehman Brothers certainly marked a 
collective awakening about the scope of the economic problems that lay 
ahead. The date Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy, September 15th, 2008 
marked the date when the voters realized that the financial crisis would turn 
2011,  5 3 THE JOURNAL OF PREDICTION MARKETS 
 
 
50 
into an economic downturn which would batter both Wall Street and Main 
Street in the years to come. 
 
METHOD AND DATA 
 
We analyze the impact of the events using weekly averaged observations 
of polls and market predictions in the campaign period of the two elections. 
Having weekly observation points allows us to track developments closely. 
Super Tuesday is usually the day when both candidates of the two major 
parties in effect have been nominated, and thus the start of the “long 
campaign”(Caesar and Busch 2005: 107-109). In 2004 this was March 2nd. In 
2008, however, the Democratic nomination would last far longer than Super 
Tuesday, until June 5th. In order to maintain a sufficient number of 
observations, we nonetheless define both campaign periods as starting in the 
first week of March. Each of the series has 35 observations. 
There are mainly two types of election markets: The vote share market, 
and the winner-takes-all market (WTA). The former is a market where the 
traders invest in their expectations of how big a share one of the candidates 
will receive of the popular vote (i.e. John McCain will get 48% of the votes). 
The latter is a market where the traders invest in the probability that one of the 
candidates will win the presidency (i.e. John McCains chances in becoming 
president is 40%). 5 In this study we prefer vote share market prices rather 
than winner-takes-all prices for two reasons. First, vote share prices are 
directly comparable to polls, as they both estimate the vote share of the 
competing candidates. Second, all other being equal, for each day the election 
approaches WTA prices should increase the probability of winning for the 
favorite candidate and decrease the probability of winning for the other 
candidate(s). This is so because the “window of opportunity” for unexpected 
events to occur steadily becomes narrower. Vote share prices on the other 
hand, remain put at the same level if no unexpected events occur. The time 
component which must be included in an analysis of WTA prices is not 
                                                     
5 These two types of expectations should not be confused. There is not a fixed 
probability prediction attached to the predicted vote share level. If a trader believes 
that McCain is likely to get 48% of the popular vote, her estimated probability that he 
wins the election depends on how hard she thinks it would be for McCain to get from 
48 per cent to above 50 per cent. In an election with many swing voters this 
achievement will be easier than in an election where the parties and the voters are 
very polarized, hence the probability that he will win will differ in these two contexts 
even though the vote share estimate is the same. Or, as Campbell et al. (Campbell et 
al. 1966: 22) put it; “responsiveness to short-term forces varies inversely with the 
strength of party identification.” 
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necessary in an analysis of vote share prices, and therefore less complicated to 
use.  
The data will be analyzed visually and statistically. We test whether any 
of our coded events have had an impact on the values of our weekly poll and 
market series. Our two models to be tested expressed in general terms as 
 
Yt = Į + ȕ1Yt-1 + ȕ2It + İt,       (1) 
 
where Į is a constant, Yt-1 is the dependent variable at time t-1, It is the 
intervention variable, and İt is the noise component. For each event included 
in the analysis two dummy variables were created. One was a step function 
variable coding the week of the event and all subsequent events with the value 
1 and the rest with the value 0. The other was a pulse function variable coding 
the week of the event with the value 1 and all other weeks with the value 0. 
This allows us to separate temporary effects from permanent effects. If a step 
function variable has a statistically significant effect on Yt, the maximum 
magnitude of the permanent effect can be calculated as ȕ 2 / (1 – ȕ 1).  
The effect of each individual variable is analyzed controlling for the 
values of the observation point Yt-1. The benefit of including the dependent 
variable’s lagged value is that it controls for all unobserved effects already 
incorporated in the polls or market predictions and thus compensates for an 
underspecified model. This is an advantage in our situation where we have 
weekly observations which do not allow us to control for standard economic 
variables such as inflation and GDP growth. If any of our dummy variables 
have a statistically significant impact we therefore then know that this is new 
information which has been added to the poll ratings or market predictions at 
that specific observation point. Incorporating the lagged dependent variable 
also gives an indication of whether the series is non-stationary. 
The Iowa Electronic Market (IEM) is the only prediction market which 
has publicly available data for the two elections we analyze, and therefore we 
use their vote share market data in the analysis. Their vote share market prices 
have been retrieved from their internet site http://www.biz.uiowa.edu/iem/. 
The IEM series for the two elections represent the weekly predictions of the 
two-party vote share for the incumbent party’s candidates in 2004 and in 
2008. Daily observations of the closing prices have been allocated into weekly 
averaged prices. Since the market by definition is a two-party race, the total 
should theoretically always sum up to 100 percent. Hence, the prices have not 
been standardized.6  
                                                     
6 We shall later see that this assumption is not empirically supported for all 
observations. 
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All opinion poll data for the 2004 election are collected from the internet 
sites of the pollster magazine Polling report, 170 polls in total. 7 
Pollingreport.com is partly free of use and open for everybody.  Presented 
there are all the major national polls and each poll’s exact question wording. 
Data for 2008 were retrieved from the site realclearpolitics.com. 8 A total of 
293 polls are included in the analysis from the 2008 election. The poll series 
for the two elections are weekly averaged poll ratings for the incumbent 
party’s candidate. The last day of polling determines which week the polls 
belong to. Furthermore, all polls are standardized so that they reflect the 
relative strength between the two dominant Republican and Democratic 
parties. The total poll score of the Republican and the Democratic candidate 
always sum to 100 per cent. 
 
ANALYSIS 
 
(a) 2004: One Election, Two Stories 
 
Figure 1 displays the weekly support for Bush as president and IEM’s 
predicted two-party vote share for the Republicans. The polls linger around 
the fifty-percent mark, with a series mean of 49.9 percent. Out of the 35 
weekly observations, ten were one percentage point or less away from the 
actual outcome of 51.2 percentage points Bush two-party vote share. In only 
six out of thirty six weeks do the polls measure his support above the 51.2 
percent he received on Election Day. The final observation landed at 50.6 
percent. 
The series mean market prediction is exactly the same as the outcome; 
51.2 percent. In all but two observations the predictions were within one 
percentage point of the outcome, and the final observation predicted 51.3 
percent vote share for Bush. The market prediction climbs over the fifty-
percent mark already after the first observation, and remains at or above it for 
the rest of the period. The traders did not lose the confidence that the 
Republicans would win the popular vote, but they believed it would be a 
rather close race. 
 
                                                     
7 Data for 2004 were collected in the period May-November 2004. Whenever there 
were two versions of the same poll – one with registered voters and one with likely 
voters – the versions with registered voters were excluded. 
8 Data collected in November 2008. Link as of May 15, 2009: 
http://www.realclearpolitics.com/epolls/2008/president/us/general_election_mccain_v
s_obama-225.html#polls 
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A visual inspection of Figure 1 above shows that the polls and the IEM 
market tell two different stories about the development of the election 
campaign in 2004. Reacting more vividly to current events, the polls told a 
more dramatic story about the campaign than the IEM market did; the weekly 
ups and downs were greater, and the race was closer in the polls than in the 
prediction market. Most striking is the relative stability of the market 
predictions. With the exception of the first observation at 48.3 percent, all 
observations vary within three percentage points, from 50.3 to 52.8. The 
standard deviation of the market predictions is 0.82, considerably lower than 
the polls’ 1.57. Furthermore, the market prediction lies consistently higher 
than the polls do, except for the end of the period, where the picture is more 
mixed.  
40%
45%
50%
55%
60%
65%
Mar 1 Apr 5 May 10 Jun 14 Jul 19 Aug 23 Sep 27
IEM predictions
Polls
Outcome
Figure 1
2004 US Presidential Election
Weekly Poll Ratings And IEM Predictions
Two-party Vote Share for Bush
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The Abu Ghraib scandal in the week of April 26 does not seem to have 
had a lasting negative impact for Bush’s poll ratings, as their slip is recovered 
the week after. The handover of power in Iraq however coincides with a sharp 
drop in the ratings for Bush. Within two weeks Bush fell 3.7 percentage 
points at the polls, reaching his lowest level ever for the period, at 47.2 
percentage points. The start of the Swift Boat Veterans ad campaign in the 
week of August 2 is followed by a four week long surge for the President. 
Bush’s poll ratings soared from his second-lowest score at 47.3 to his second 
highest level of 52.8 percentage points. If the causes of these poll changes are 
those here pointed to, we read out of the polls that war issues were central 
throughout the campaign.  
The IEM market did not tell the same story. After a low-scoring first week 
for Bush, his vote share prediction rose within few weeks to around 52 
percent, and never again dipped below the 50 percent mark. In contrast to the 
polls’ roller-coaster ride under and above the 50 percent mark, the prediction 
market floated around 51 percent throughout the period, minimally affected 
by the topics that dominated the campaign. None of our three events seems to 
have affected the election market predictions. The war issue did not stand out 
as a significant factor. 
 
(1) Impact assessment 
 
None of the events had a statistically significant impact on the weekly 
market predictions. Neither did the Abu Ghraib scandal or the Iraqi handover 
of power have any effect on the poll ratings. This is not to say that the Iraq 
war was not a central matter for the voters, but rather that these two events 
concerning the war did not manifest themselves as factors that influenced the 
aggregate vote on Election Day in November. 
 
The Swift Boat Veteran ads were however positively influencing 
President Bush’s poll ratings, with a permanent effect lasting until Election 
Day: 
According to the analysis of the polls, the Swift Boat Veteran ads were 
needed in order for Bush to surge and subsequently win majority on Election 
Day. The last week before voting day they ended up fairly close to the 
election result (see Figure 1). 
The market prediction also came very close to the result the final week, 
but they never experienced any surge caused by the Swift Boat campaign 
identified in the polls. They were stably predicting the vote share that the polls 
reached only after the Republican convention and the Swift Boat campaign.  
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Table 2. Impact assessment of events during the 2004 US presidential election. 
 
 Polls 
n = 35 
IEM 
n = 35 
 First  
models 9 
Final model First models Final model 
     
Constant  29.33 
(4.09) 
 30.93 
(5.06) 
Yt-1  0.40 
(2.78) 
 0.40 
(3.34) 
Abu Ghraib (pulse) -1.71 
(-1.34) 
 0.15 
(0.26) 
 
Abu Ghraib (step) -0.33 
(-0.60) 
 -0.32 
(-1.33) 
 
Iraq 
Handover(pulse) 
-1.71 
(-1.34) 
 1.11 
(1.92) 
 
Iraq Handover (step) 0.08 
(0.18) 
 -0.25 
(-1.32) 
 
Swift Boat (pulse) -0.02 
(-1.68) 
 0.00 
(0.62) 
 
Swift Boat (step) 1.21 
(2.55) 
1.21 
(2.55) 
-0.31 
(-1.50) 
 
Adj. R2  0.43  0.11 
AIC  3.24  1.49 
LM test (4 lags), 
Prob. F 
 0.93  0.49 
     
t-statistics in parentheses 
What did the market traders know that the poll respondents only realized 
after the Swift Boat campaign? If the equilibrium level hypothesis is true, then 
the traders must have known that the Swift Boat ads would run and that they 
would boost the ratings of the incumbent president. This is unlikely since the 
ad campaign was initiated by a previously unknown group supposedly 
                                                     
9 The first models have been estimated with a constant, Yt-1,, and one dummy variable 
on the right hand side. Those with a significant effect in the first models have been 
considered in the final model. 
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unattached to the Republican Party. However, the Swift Boat ads should not 
be interpreted as an isolated event that saved the campaign of the incumbent 
president. Rather, it should be seen as an event that released a vote potential 
which was already there for George W. Bush to exploit. Presidential 
incumbency is as previously mentioned a great advantage for the candidate, 
and when the nation after all is at war in both Afghanistan and Iraq, voters 
may be reluctant to gamble on an unknown card when push comes to shove. 
Hence, it is not the ads as such that convince the voters. Rather, the ads and 
the following attention surrounding them help enlighten the voters about their 
true preferences. Had not the Swift Boat ads been run, the effective campaign 
of the President and his staff would probably have found another way to put 
Senator Kerry’s credibility into question. 
 
(b) 2008: One Election, One Story 
 
A quick glance at Figure 2 reveals two outlying observations on the IEM 
series for the weeks of May 5 and 12. These values are a product of a market 
error and have been treated as such in our analysis. 10 
The mean value of weekly poll ratings is 48.1, with a standard deviation 
of 1.42. Of the 35 weekly observations, 30 are below the 50 per cent mark, 
while five are above it. When the outliers are replaced with interpolated 
values the mean value of the market predictions is 47.5 and the standard 
deviation is 1.25. They are somewhat closer to the actual two-party vote result 
for McCain than the poll ratings are, and a bit less volatile as well. However, 
the general picture for 2008 is that the two series follow each other quite 
closely compared to the election in 2004. 11 
                                                     
10 The price history data from IEM show that the reason for the sudden and dramatic 
rise was one single trade which pushed up the closing price from 47.6 to 74.0 for the 
Republican candidate. It was the last trade of the day, and the following three days 
there were no new trades in the market. Therefore, the price remained at 74.0 for four 
out of the seven days of the week. At the same period of time, the Democrat’s 
contract was traded at 50.1. Hence, the price that theoretically should always equal 
100 now predicted that the Democrats and the Republicans in total would win 124.1 
per cent of the votes! Also the following week there was heavy trade on McCain, 
which momentarily pushed the price up to 58.5, while the Democratic contract 
remained stable at 51.0. This price was however corrected the following day. In our 
impact assessment these two observations have been accounted for by creating a 
dummy variable called “ERROR”, which takes the value 1 on weeks of May 5 and 12, 
and 0 for all other observations.  
11 When the two extreme values on the market series are replaced by interpolated 
values, the two series are correlated at 0, 1, and 2 lags with the polls as leading 
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Poll ratings and market predictions move in different directions at the time 
when Sarah Palin is presented as VP candidate. The polls indicate a temporary 
gain in support for McCain, while the market traders lower their expectations 
of the Republican candidate’s vote share on Election Day. 
The Lehman Brothers collapse in the week of September 15 corresponds 
with a sharp fall in poll ratings for McCain, and a smaller fall in the market 
predictions. The sharp drop in poll ratings might partly be due to the fallback 
                                                                                                                               
variable. This could be an indication that the market absorbs information from the 
poll ratings. 
40%
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from a convention bounce after the Republican Convention, but the ratings do 
not recover before they fall to the second lowest level for the whole period, at 
45.6 points in the week of October 6. On the last week before Election Day, 
the candidate of the incumbent party has recovered slightly in the polls and 
end up at 46.1%. The fall in the market prediction has the same development 
during and in the aftermath of the Lehman Brothers event, though with less 
extreme values. McCain’s predicted vote share fell five consecutive weeks for 
a total of 2.6 percentage points, before it recovered marginally the last couple 
of weeks and ended up at 46.6.  
 
(1) Impact assessment 
 
The collapse of Lehman Brothers had a significant and permanent 
negative effect on both poll ratings and market predictions for John McCain, 
while the selection of Palin as VP had no influence on either the polls or 
market predictions (Table 3). The Republican candidate’s winning chances 
might have been grim irrespective of the financial crisis, but that event seems 
to have been the nail in the coffin for senator McCain. According to our 
typology the Lehman collapse was an enlightened event, meaning that the 
event was not helping voters realizing their political preferences, but rather 
changed them.  
As described earlier, September 15th 2008 marked a dramatic shift with 
regards to the perception of the American economy. It is indeed possible that 
some voters would reassess their political preferences in the face of the 
economic challenges the nation had to brace itself for. Though it can be 
debated to what extent the Republican Party as such is to blame for the system 
deficiencies that led to the financial crisis, “more of the same” politics might 
not be what the voters perceived as the right approach towards the challenges 
ahead. The mood in the election campaign coincided well with Barack 
Obama’s main message of change. Although we can speculate that he most 
likely would have won the majority of the votes regardless of the financial 
crisis, the event of Lehman Brothers’ collapse helped him securing the 
victory. 
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Table 3. Impact assessment of events during the 2008 US presidential 
election. 
 
 Polls 
n = 35 
IEM 
n = 35 
 
 First 
models 12 
Final 
model 
First 
models 
Final 
model 
 
      
Constant  23.47 
(3.54) 
 32.05 
(11.71) 
 
Yt-1  0.51 
(3.76) 
 0.33 
(5.78) 
 
Market error   15.25 15.07 
(15.46) 
 
Palin VP 
(pulse) 
-0.30 
(-0.25) 
 1.41 
(-1.40) 
  
Palin VP 
(step) 
-0.39 
(-0.90) 
 -0.42 
(-1.11) 
  
Lehman 
collapse 
(pulse) 
-0.83 
(-0.69) 
 0.49 
(0.47) 
  
Lehman 
collapse 
(step) 
-1.07 
(-2.29) 
-1.07 
(-2.29) 
-0.83 
(-2.01) 
-0.83 
(-2.01) 
 
Adj. R2  0.45  0.89  
AIC  3.04  2.86  
LM test (4 
lags), Prob F. 
 0.89  0.07 13  
      
t-statistics in parentheses 
 
                                                     
12 The first models have been estimated with a constant, Yt-1,, the “error” dummy, and 
one dummy variable on the right hand side. Those with a significant effect in the first 
models have been considered in the final model. 
13 At lag one the test is significant at 5% level, but not at 1% level. This indicates that 
the results may be somewhat optimistic, and that they should be interpreted with 
caution. 
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
Table 4 summarizes all events for both elections and indicates which 
category they fall into. Our analysis has shown that few events unfolding 
during the two campaigns could on their own influence the voters’ decisions 
on Election Day. The majority of the voters have most likely made up their 
mind long time in advance, and the undecided vote on a basis of many 
considerations which cannot be directly connected to any single event. For 
each of the 2004 and the 2008 elections however, we were indeed able to 
detect one such event. 
 
Table 4. Events 2004 and 2008 
 
 Market reaction? 
Yes No 
 
 
Poll 
reaction? 
Yes Enlightened event: 
LEHMAN BROTHERS 
COLLAPSE 
 
Enlightening events: 
SWIFT BOAT 
VETERANS 
 
No 
 
Early reaction by 
markets for enlightened 
event (or error/ 
manipulation): 
MARKET ERROR 
 
Irrelevant events (or 
method unable to detect 
reaction): 
ABU GHRAIB 
IRAQ HANDOVER 
PALIN VP 
 
The stable IEM predictions in 2004, which turned out to be very close to 
the actual outcome, indicate that the traders were aware of which conditions 
the voters in the end would emphasize, and therefore that the market 
predictions represented the equilibrium level for the 2004 presidential 
election. The only event that significantly changed the poll ratings – the Swift 
Boat ads – moved the ratings up to the level where the market predictions had 
been lying stably throughout the campaign. It may seem as a paradox that an 
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event which moved the polls permanently to a higher level contains no 
relevance for the outcome. In reality, it was indeed relevant, but already 
priced into the prediction. The news would be if Bush had not been able to 
capitalize on his advantages as incumbent president in war time, against an 
opponent with which the voters were less familiar with and thus more 
suspicious towards.  
During the 2008 election campaign, the Lehman Brothers collapse lead to 
a sudden change of focus in the election campaign, putting the state of the 
economy at the very top of the agenda. As we have seen from our analysis 
these extraordinary circumstances not only affected the poll ratings, but also 
the vote share predictions of the Iowa Electronic Market. While poll ratings 
reflect the voters’ enlightening process, this market reacts in theory only to 
“real” news. If it is true that the voters undergo enlightenment during the 
campaign period, then rational traders should already in advance have 
incorporated this process into their expectations. The fact that they had not 
done so with this event suggests that the situation the American voters 
suddenly found themselves in during the last few weeks of the election 
campaign was something new and particular to that election. 
In hindsight it is evident that a financial crisis was about to unfold. Before 
September 15th, however, this was apparent to only a very few. And that it 
should happen just a few weeks before the presidential election was more a 
matter of coincidence than anything else. Once the Lehman Brothers 
collapsed the effects both on the poll ratings and market predictions were 
immediate, permanent, and in favour of Obama. In contrast to the Swift Boat 
ads, the Lehman collapse hence was an enlightened event which by its own 
virtue changed the vote share outcome of the election. 
This paper has demonstrated the benefits of studying price movements in 
prediction markets in combination with poll movements during the US 
presidential campaigns. We have identified two events which have had an 
impact on the last two presidential elections. By analyzing poll ratings and 
IEM predictions together, we have also shown that one event moved the vote 
towards the expected level, while the other changed the level. 
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